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Abstract: Inference attacks and protection measures are two sides of the same coin. Although the
former aims to reveal information while the latter aims to hide it, they both increase awareness
regarding the risks and threats from social media apps. On the one hand, inference attack studies
explore the types of personal information that can be revealed and the methods used to extract it.
An additional risk is that geosocial media data are collected massively for research purposes, and
the processing or publication of these data may further compromise individual privacy. On the
other hand, consistent and increasing research on location protection measures promises solutions
that mitigate disclosure risks. In this paper, we examine recent research efforts on the spectrum of
privacy issues related to geosocial network data and identify the contributions and limitations of
these research efforts. Furthermore, we provide protection recommendations to researchers that
share, anonymise, and store social media data or publish scientific results.
Keywords: privacy; geoprivacy; geosocial network data; location-based social
networks; anonymisation
1. Geosocial Network Data in Research
In recent years, data from geosocial networks such as Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, Foursquare and
others have become a comprehensively used basis for geospatial analysis in a number of application
areas, including disaster management (Laituri and Kodrich 2008; Resch et al. 2018), public health and
epidemiology (Santillana et al. 2015; Boulos et al. 2011), urban planning (Foth et al. 2011; Resch et al.
2016), traffic management (Pan et al. 2013; Steiger et al. 2016a), crime analysis (Malleson and Andresen
2015; Ristea et al. 2018; Kounadi et al. 2018), and others. While early research efforts focused on simple
analysis using traditional methods (Girardin et al. 2008; Sagl et al. 2012), more recent research has
developed more sophisticated approaches, including self-learning systems such as artificial neural
networks (ANN) (Steiger et al. 2016b), machine learning semantic topic models (Hasan and Ukkusuri
2014; Kovacs-Gyori et al. 2018) or real-time analysis algorithms (Sakaki et al. 2010).
Resulting from the rapid development of social media analysis, data analysis methods have
become more robust and results more reliable. In turn, geosocial networks are meanwhile
acknowledged as a high-quality data source that supports the investigation of real-world problems
and subsequent decision-making. This development has been fostered by the dramatically increasing
availability of social media posts throughout the world, particularly in urban settings. Consequently,
we have witnessed the emergence of far-reaching analysis efforts that investigate urban processes at a
remarkably high spatial and temporal resolution.
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On the downside, this leads to the pressing question of how to preserve the privacy of social
media users, an issue which is becoming more and more serious as the spatial and temporal density of
social media posts increases. This is because extracting user profiles and identifying single users can
be done relatively easily by analysing accumulated social media posts, particularly when coupled with
other data sources such as demographic data, statistical data or household data, which are increasingly
available as open-source repositories (Steiger et al. 2015).
Potential infringements, which may arise when analysing geosocial media data and when
publishing according results, include revealing a user’s identity, building behaviour profiles of users,
generating political profiles of users, putting users at physical risk (e.g., lateral thinkers, public figures,
etc.), or making information permanently available on the Internet. Therefore, these infringements
are particularly critical as fine-grained research outputs may only constitute a surrogate for more
concrete and personal influences on users: A spatial accumulation of “negative emotions”, “high
traffic volumes”, or “bad air quality” may have very direct consequences on a user’s permanent stress
level, their quality of life or even their life expectancy. Thus, more accurate, finer-grained or more
complete information may in some cases not necessarily be desirable, as this would potentially allow
for conclusions regarding the subjects’ identity on a very small scale or, in extreme cases, even on the
individual level (Resch 2013).
For the particular case of geosocial media, the responsibility for sharing data in “appropriate”
semantic, content-wise, spatial and temporal detail cannot be shifted to the user because terms and
conditions of the use of social networks are mostly articulated in convoluted and hardly understandable
language. Posts in geosocial media are usually available through (public) Application Programming
Interfaces (API), which enable data access without the users’ awareness even though users knowingly
and consensually share their data as agreed in the terms and conditions of a geosocial network
application. The above-mentioned conditions necessitate a rigorous way of handling data from
geosocial media to preserve the users’ privacy. The challenge of this goal lies in the spatial nature
of geosocial media data: The first of the 21 theses in the “Geoprivacy Manifesto” by Keßler and
McKenzie (2018) says that “information about an individual’s location is substantially different from
other kinds of personally identifiable information”. Individual time trajectories in space reveal activity
spaces (e.g., locations of work, social clubs, day care, grocery, place of worship, etc.) that can, in
turn, be processed to get insights on human behaviour and detect personal profiles (Armstrong et al.
2018). Therefore, the major factor that makes spatial information more challenging is the potential of
inferences on identity that may be drawn.
This paper discusses privacy risks associated with research efforts using geosocial media data,
identifies the limitations of existing studies regarding inference and protection, and proposes a set
of geoprivacy-by-design recommendations with respect to sharing these data, anonymising them,
publishing the resulting maps, modalities of data storage, and privacy-preserving measures. This
is followed by a thorough discussion of the proposed recommendations, particularly in light of the
recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and a set of future research directions in the area of
geoprivacy. Furthermore, this paper addresses the use (storage, analysis, visualisation and sharing) of
geosocial network data, but it shall not be understood as a guideline relevant to building location-based
social networks.
2. Background on Inferences, Users, and Policies
Studies on location inference attacks examine the types of personal information that can be
revealed from individual-level spatial trajectories and the accuracy of inferred information. Thus,
privacy policies in research efforts involving LBSN data should take possible inference attacks into
consideration (Section 2.1) and provide mechanisms that are in line with the users’ preferences and
attitudes towards privacy protection (Section 2.2).
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2.1. Inference Attacks vs. Risk of Re-Identification
In this section, we review the literature on inference attacks and re-identification risk from spatial
trajectory data. First, we should clarify the difference between inference attacks and re-identification.
Inference is to draw conclusions based on observations and analytical results of the data. For instance,
given a set of locations of a GPS user, the clusters of high point intensity can be computed. Then,
the central point of the cluster with the highest density can be assumed as the home location of the
user, especially if there are temporal signals during late night hours when people usually stay at
home. In statistical terms, inference is accompanied by accuracy results. To calculate the accuracy of
inference, true outcomes should be measurable. This means that, in the previous example, the true
home location of the user is known and compared with the estimated one. However, this is not always
the case for the studies on inference attacks from location data. Hence, in many cases, inference attacks
show the potential of the kind of information that can be disclosed without necessarily validating the
conclusions. On the other hand, re-identification involves a disclosure method as well as an accuracy
assessment against the actual information.
Taking this distinction into consideration, most of the studies have examined the potential of
drawing conclusions about the private matters of individuals, and only few of these studies validated
the degree to which such conclusions are accurate (Table 1, category: validation data). Types of
re-identified information are, for example, the prediction of a social media user’s next location in
a georeferenced post (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Cohn 2013), the location of social media posts from a
georeferenced dataset (Schulz et al. 2013), or the home address and identity of individuals that
carry GPS receivers (Krumm 2007). Other studies evaluated their inference results questionably
because the validation data that were used had significant limitations. Zang and Bolot (2011) aimed at
detecting the home and work locations of cell phone users, but only had 12 subscribers to validate their
results. Li et al. (2016) employed a significant number of participants in their experiments in order
to reveal highly sensitive information from geosocial network media data and Wi-Fi traffic records
such as age, gender, education, living place, and location patterns. However, the participants are only
representative of a particular subgroup of the population, that is, people who work, study, or live on
a university campus. One could argue that the sample’s characteristics are considerably less variant
than a representative sample of the general population and thus easier to predict. For example, more
than half of the participants have a bachelor’s degree, and there are only three types of education
levels (i.e., bachelor, master, and PhD). In addition, Schulz et al. (2013) inferred the home location of
Twitter users and then validated the estimated home location by using the last location of the user as
ground truth. Similarly, Pontes et al. (2012) validated an estimated city of a user using as ground truth
the information provided in the user’s home city attribute. All approaches highlight the potential for
re-identification but do not reveal the actual re-identified information.
The information that can be inferred or re-identified varies from barely sensitive, such as the
country of an individual, to highly sensitive such as private locations, next locations or even the
identity of a user. Most inference approaches are based on heuristics (Krumm 2007; Gambs et al. 2010;
Zang and Bolot 2011; Pontes et al. 2012; De Montjoye et al. 2013; Schulz et al. 2013; Li and Goodchild
2013; Lampoltshammer et al. 2014), and on clustering and classification (Lampoltshammer et al. 2014;
Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Cohn 2013; Gambs et al. 2010; Li et al. 2016). Although data from public sources
can be used as a ground truth information, there has been only one study in which they were used
(Krumm 2007) (Table 1, category: inference approach).
Furthermore, some of these studies propose measures to protect subjects’ anonymity in location
trajectories, such as perturbation, aggregation (e.g., areal, point, or temporal), considering the desired
level of privacy defined by user preferences, shortening the time collection period, and removing
sensitive areas (i.e., spatial cloaking) (Table 1, category: countermeasures). Most of these measures
deliver sufficiently large anonymous datasets and may work well for plain spatiotemporal trajectories.
Nevertheless, in Section 7, we outline the limitations of the k-anonymity concept with respect to
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geosocial network data, due to the diversity and variety of potential disclosed information, and we
explain why alternative measures based on differential privacy or l-diversity are preferable.
Table 1. Literature review on re-identification and inference attacks from location data.
Inferred or Re-Identified Information Location Data
• Identity: 1
• Home: 1, 2, 3, 6, 9
• Home, work: 3, 8
• Home, work, private
locations: 3
• City: 4
• State: 4
• Country: 4
• Trace uniqueness: 5
• Location of post: 6
• Cluster: 7
• Next movement: 7
• Location pattern: 10
• Demographics: 10
• GPS: 1, 2
• Cell Phone data: 3, 5
• LBSN data: 4, 6, 9, 7, 8, 9, 10
• Wi-Fi traffic records: 10
Inference Approach Validation Data Countermeasures
• Heuristics: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10
• Clustering/Classification: 2,
7, 9, 10
• Public data: 1
• Social applications data: 10
• Probabilistic models: 7, 10
• Yes: 1, 6, 7
• No: 2, 3, 5, 9, 8
• Non-significant sample
size: 3
• Non-representative
sample: 10
• Questionable accuracy: 4, 6
• Spatial cloaking: 1
• Perturbation: 1, 2
• Spatial aggregation:
• 1, 3, 5
• Temporal aggregation:
• 2, 5
• Shorten collection time: 3
• Based on user preferences: 10
Study (Reference, Study Area (If Stated), Data, and Subjects)
1. (Krumm 2007), 172 participants carrying GPS receivers on their vehicles
2. (Gambs et al. 2010), San Francisco—US, 90 taxi trails
3. (Zang and Bolot 2011), 50 states—US, 30 billion call records of 20 million cell phone users
4. (Pontes et al. 2012), Global, Foursquare public lists of 13 million users
5. (De Montjoye et al. 2013), Western country, 15 months of mobility data from phone interactions of
1.5 M people
6. (Schulz et al. 2013), Global, 1 Million georeferenced tweets
7. (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Cohn 2013), Globe, Foursquare check-ins of 9167 users
8. (Li and Goodchild 2013), Los Angeles—USA, georeferenced tweets of 5 heavy users
9. (Lampoltshammer et al. 2014), London—UK, georeferenced tweets about crime events
10. (Li et al. 2016), China, GPS trajectories and social media data of 30 participants in five apps and Wi-Fi
traffic records of 22,843 users
2.2. Users’ Privacy Preferences
Geosocial network data are provided voluntarily by the users who are also the data subjects.
Their preferences on the protection of personal privacy in LBSN have been studied and conceptualised
as opinions, attitudes, and behaviours. Beldad and Kusumadewi (2015) identified major determinants
of sharing locations in LBSN. The first two are related to personal benefits, such as entertainment
and impression management (i.e., controlling the impression they have on others), while the third
one is trusting the competences of an application to protect personal privacy. A similar study on
location information disclosure behaviour also confirms that privacy risks weaken the relationship
between perceived benefits and intention to disclose personal information (Sun et al. 2015). In addition,
both studies on location disclosure behaviour found that there are significant gender differences in
the responses of the participants. Benisch et al. (2011) performed a survey on 27 participants and
collected their location trajectories over three weeks. Then, the participants ranked and explained their
disclosing criteria. One of the most significant findings was that the decision of users of whether or not
to disclose their locations varies depending on the time of the day, the day of the week, and their exact
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location. A second finding, which is important for policy implementation, is that users would prefer
a more complex location- and time-based privacy set of rules over a simpler approach that restricts
disclosed information to a particular group (i.e., friends or family).
On the other hand, people’s opinions, attitudes, and behaviours regarding geoprivacy risks are
connected to their geoprivacy awareness, which is not yet widely spread and well understood. Half
or more of the participants in a location awareness study had no idea if: (a) their profiles in Twitter
and Instagram are private or public; (b) they use the geolocation feature; and (c) they ever changed
default privacy settings (Furini and Tamanini 2015). Another study asked participants to state their
awareness of 14 types of inference attacks from geosocial network data (e.g., to infer home and work
location, to know their friend network and weekly habits, etc.) (Alrayes and Abdelmoty 2014). More
than one-third of the participants were not aware of possible attacks such as these related to other
people being able to know what their personal activities are.
Users’ preferences regarding the protection of their geosocial data are diverse and probably linked
to their awareness about which data are available (on the Internet) and how they can be used. Thus,
it is not advisable for researchers or institutions to construct privacy by design guidelines based on
generalised preferences of the public who lack specialised knowledge on geoprivacy implications.
2.3. Privacy Policies in LBSN
Gambs et al. (2011) gave a comprehensive overview of the privacy policies implemented by four
LBSN (Foursquare, Qype, La Ruche and Twitter). They identified the following eight privacy criteria
and also checked whether the LBSN adhere to them:
Privacy criteria in LBSN:
1. Registration information: How much personal information from users is needed for registration?
2. Real identities versus pseudonyms: Are users allowed to use pseudonyms instead of their
real name?
3. Information available to others (friends, public, and third parties): What personal information
about users is disclosed to other parties operating on the LBSN?
4. Privacy settings: Do users have control over how their data is collected, used and disseminated?
5. Terms of use and privacy policy: Does the LBSN provide an explicit and easily understandable
policy in which users are informed about how their data are used?
6. Policy of data retention in case of account deletion: Does the LSBN delete all data from a user
after they delete their network account?
7. Mobility data collection and management: Are location data collected continuously or only when
a user action requires location data access?
8. Security features: Does the LBSN implement reasonable IT security measures to prevent
data theft?
The authors concluded that the platforms largely do not implement measures to fit the criteria and
provide a list of practical recommendations for LBSN to use. Vicente et al. (2011) performed a similar
study that examines a larger number of LBSN and outlines the features of the services that increase the
re-identification risk. These features are the real-time publication time (occurs in 43% of the examined
LBSNs of the study), the use of exact location (occurs in 62% of the LBSNs), and the ability to tag or
check-in multiple users (occurs in 19% of the LBSNs). However, only 14% of the LBSNs use anonymous
user identities, which is a feature that decreases the re-identification risk. Furthermore, some of their
listed LBSN pose privacy issues for users, although they leave a threat formalisation to future studies
and suggest spatial and temporal cloaking as a possible privacy protection measure. Further, they
provided an outlook, in which they name user awareness of publishing location information as a factor
in privacy protection.
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3. Data Sharing
Researchers may share processed or unprocessed datasets for several reasons, for example, to
allow research replicability, to establish synergies with research partners, or to publish in open data
scientific journals. These datasets, typically, do not contain key identifiers (i.e., name, home address,
etc.), but pseudonyms (i.e., username) that can be used to derive subsets for each subject. Inferential
disclosure can be applied to the attributes (e.g., location) and reveal not only the identity but also
further personal information about the subject.
Starting with the inferential disclosure of the subject’s identity, an attacker may use the subject’s
space-time stamps to make a guess about their potential home address. In a study that used
GPS trajectories of participants, the author re-engineered the real home addresses with a median
distance error of 60.7 meters and the identity of a small fraction of the participants (Krumm 2007).
Furthermore, LBSN data contain additional attributes that can lead to greater information disclosure
compared to GPS data. Alrayes and Abdelmoty (2014) enlisted twelve types of disclosure that can be
inferred from combining and analysing the spatial, temporal, and non-spatial semantics such as times
spent away from home, activities during weekends, and time and location of meetings with friends,
amongst others.
The simplest approach to mitigating such privacy threats is to remove pseudonyms and other
information that can be used to derive subsets per subject prior to the release of a dataset. This can
indeed be an effective solution, since many studies are interested in aggregated results, such as the
spatial-temporal distribution of a topic of interest in a study area. If analysis by user or group of users is
needed, pseudonyms may be stored, but the dataset has to be anonymised. Prior to the anonymisation,
the data holder should consider the total number of observations by time intervals per user. Time
information is critical in inferring personal information from geosocial network data. For example,
locations derived after midnight and during weekdays can be used as a starting dataset to infer home
addresses. The probability of an accurate inference is related to the entropy of the locations; in other
words, the lower the entropy, the higher or more confident the inference is. More observations within
a time interval may lower the entropy, resulting in easier detectability of a pattern. Ultimately, this
depends on the temporal frequency of posts by users. A user with sporadic posts may be harder
to identify compared to a frequently posting user. Thus, restricting the temporal frequency of the
observations per user can be an anonymisation strategy to mitigate disclosure risk.
There are several methods for the anonymisation of LBSN data, which are critically discussed
in Section 7. The primary criterion for the selection of an optimal method is that it protects the
data sufficiently based on an anonymity measure, such as k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002), l-diversity
(Machanavajjhala et al. 2007), or differential privacy (Dwork 2008). Another significant criterion
is the spatial effect that a method imposes on the anonymised dataset. For instance, anonymised
data produced by random perturbation approaches detect spatial clusters more accurately than data
produced by aggregation approaches (Hampton et al. 2010; Kounadi and Leitner 2016). On the other
hand, aggregation may be preferred if data are to be analysed or visualised in the same aggregation
level as the anonymised data. The effect should also be calculated and communicated to future users.
Kounadi and Resch (2018) proposed several measures that calculate the effect of the spatial error of the
spatial analysis to be performed.
Recommendations:
1. Remove pseudonyms or other subject identification attributes.
2. Anonymise data if subject distinguishability is required.
3. Ensure anonymisation method provides sufficient protection based on an anonymity measure.
4. Select a method that minimises the spatial effect on the anonymised dataset based on their utility.
5. Calculate the spatial effect of anonymised data on certain types of analysis.
6. Communicate anonymity level and accuracy errors of anonymised data to future users.
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4. Anonymised Data
Post-anonymisation practices may also involve disclosure risks. One example is when the data
holder releases multiple versions of anonymised copies of original data. Research on a method that
is based on a Gaussian perturbation shows that the more anonymised copies are released, the more
accurately an attacker can infer the original locations (Cassa et al. 2008). The rationale is that multiple
versions of the same datasets reveal hints regarding the anonymisation approach and facilitate the
re-engineering process. This also implies that data holders should carefully consider how much and
what type of information on the anonymisation method should be published.
In particular, Zimmerman and Pavlik (2008) suggested that metadata information on methods
such as aggregation and perturbation may increase the disclosure risk. For example, if an attacker
knows that data are perturbed based on a normal distribution, they will recognize that there are
greater chances to re-identify an original location when looking in close proximity to the anonymised
location. The disclosure risk, in this case, is higher to that of a perturbation based on a random
distribution. Therefore, metadata information on the anonymisation method should be restricted
unless the data holder is confident that releasing this information will not increase the disclosure risk.
Fortunately, some methods guarantee privacy even when the attacker knows details about the data or
the anonymisation process. These are discussed in Section 7.
Recommendations:
1. Do not release multiple versions of anonymised datasets.
2. Restrict metadata information on the anonymisation method.
5. Publication of Maps
Publication deliverables such as maps of confidential and private data may also lead to
information disclosure. More specifically, research on confidential point data shows that locations
depicted on maps in scientific publications can be re-engineered with considerable accuracy either from
a digital or a printed map (Brownstein et al. 2006; Leitner et al. 2007). To the best of our knowledge, no
similar research has been conducted regarding social media data. However, if a map distinguishes
locations or trips by data subject, a similar re-engineering process can be used and, thus, the risk of
disclosure remains.
Researchers must ensure that public cartographic visualisations do not compromise the privacy
of the individuals involved in the dataset. A simple way to ensure privacy protection in maps is to
lower the spatial or the temporal precision and present aggregate data (Graham 2012). In addition, the
independent body Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the UK suggests to use heat maps (i.e.,
continuous or aggregated surfaces of densities) or explore alternatives of representing confidential
information on maps (ICO 2012). Of course, if researchers wish to present detailed unprocessed
information on maps, they should use the anonymised versions of their data. In line with Section 3,
the spatial error of the map should be evaluated concerning the impact it may have on the readers
when interpreting the map.
Recommendations:
1. Ensure privacy protection of public cartographic visualisations.
2. Reduce the spatial and/or temporal resolution of public maps.
3. Consider the use of heat maps or other types of cartographic visualisations.
4. Use anonymised data if it is necessary to publish detailed maps (i.e., locations or trajectories
distinguished by subject).
5. Assess the spatial error and its impact when anonymised data are used in maps.
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6. Data Storing
Boulos et al. (2009) described data security as the “missing ring” in privacy-preserving discussions
that have predominately neglected risks such as data theft, data loss, or data disclosure to non-authorised
parties. The authors highlighted several security measures (e.g., building security, cable locks,
cryptography, access authentication, etc.) and suggested a “purpose-built” combination of measures
that depend on the type, sensitivity, value, and risk of data. An expert, who acts as a designated privacy
manager and whose knowledge extends beyond location-related disclosure risks, should oversee data
storing and processing tasks. If unauthorised persons can physically access the storage devices, sensitive
data on them should be encrypted to avoid theft. In case data are to be stored or processed on machines
provided by third parties within a cloud computing environment, the entire workflow from sending the
data to receiving results has to be subject to encryption, which must not be compromised at any stage
(e.g., by the use of client-side encryption). Chen and Zhao (2012) gave a more detailed overview of cloud
computing security architectures and data security issues. On top of these measures, it is of course also
important to adhere to well-known security routines that help prevent data theft. Examples of such
measures are locking computers when not needed, not writing down passwords, using strong passwords,
and not reusing passwords.
Recommendations:
1. Assign a privacy manager or security expert to oversee data storage and processing tasks.
2. Apply all necessary security measures and best practices throughout the entire workflow.
3. If storing or processing data on third-party machines, ensure that security standards are upheld
throughout the entire workflow.
7. Privacy Concepts and Protection Methods
An approach to protect the locations of LBSN data is to prevent them from being released to
unauthorised parties. This can be achieved by allowing the user to set up their own privacy preferences
for location disclosure or by transmitting data in an encrypted form. For example, the data can be
encrypted when shared with untrusted third-party servers, and then decrypted by the users that
the data is intended for (e.g., friends) (Puttaswamy and Zhao 2010). In addition, encryptions can be
transferred to the hands of users who may apply policies on who may access their private data based
on their attributes (i.e., attribute-based encryption) (Baden et al. 2009). Another possibility is that
the users decide and adapt the granularity of their shared locations, while probabilistic encryption
ensures that their data and preferences remain private (Hu et al. 2017). A third approach is to divide
the released information between social network servers and location-based servers (Wei et al. 2012) or
to further split them into multiple location servers to prohibit access to users’ social network topology
based on their friend sets (Li et al. 2017).
Although encryption, adaptive privacy preferences, and location servers are straightforward
privacy protection approaches, they prohibit or limit the use of LBSN data for secondary purposes,
such as research studies, which are the scope of this paper. On the other hand, location transformation
promises privacy protection while data are shared openly, and data can, thus, be extracted and used for
research purposes. Armstrong et al. (1999) were the first scholars to anonymise data by transforming
their locations and established the term “geographical masking” for the protection of discrete spatial
datasets. Later approaches applied geographical masking with the privacy measure of k-anonymity,
which ensures that a data subject cannot be distinguished amongst k-1 other subjects (Sweeney 2002),
(Cassa et al. 2006; Hampton et al. 2010). This concept is best applicable to confidential datasets (e.g.,
health and crime information) such as locations of domestic violence events where each location can be
a direct link to a building or a household. In practice, spatially anonymised regions are defined based
on the dataset and underlying population, and then data are either displaced (Kounadi and Leitner
2016) or aggregated within these regions (Croft et al. 2017). Furthermore, spatiotemporal versions
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of k-anonymity, commonly known as cloaking, have been applied to location-based services data by
degrading the location and/or time information that is sent to a server to ensure that queries contain
at least k-1 users (Gruteser and Grunwald 2003; Mokbel et al. 2006; Kalnis et al. 2007). Regarding
geosocial networks, Freni et al. (2010) proposed a technique that combines generalisation, spatial
cloaking, and temporal cloaking to protect two types of privacy concerns. The first concern is the
uncontrolled disclosure of a user’s location at specific times and the second concern is the uncontrolled
disclosure of the absence of a user at a location at specific times (e.g., a user is not at work or home).
Shokri et al. (2011), in their work on location privacy of mobile users, developed a quantifier
(metric) for location privacy that is based on the incorrectness of the adversary in their inference
attack (i.e., the higher the number of incorrect inferences, the higher the privacy level is achieved).
The authors analysed the localisation of users over time from trajectories protected via k-anonymity
but found that the desired anonymity level was in some cases over or underestimated. Another
limitation of k-anonymity is that it cannot prevent disclosure from a homogeneity attack (i.e., knowing
a person who is in the database) and a background knowledge attack (i.e., knowing a person who is
in the database and additional information on the distribution of the sensitive attribute/attributes).
Unfortunately, there are many types of datasets, including LBSN data, which may suffer from these
attacks. For example, an attacker may know a user or groups of users that have accounts in a geosocial
network as well as other background information on the type of inference he/she is about to make.
Privacy concepts such as l-diversity (ensures that an equivalent class has at least l “well-represented”
values for the sensitive attributes) (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007) or differential privacy (ensures that
the presence or absence of a subject in the data does not alter the probability of the properties of
a query answer ) (Dwork 2006) are able to protect against these two types of attacks. L-diversity
results in protected datasets and differential privacy yields answers to aggregate queries. Although
both approaches were formulated in the context of statistical databases, they show great potential
for protecting data from geosocial networks and spatial data in general. Nevertheless, we should
stress that l-diversity data are still vulnerable to composition attacks (i.e., an attacker uses independent
anonymised releases about overlapping populations to compromise privacy), but a differential privacy
based approach may satisfy such conditions (Ganta et al. 2008).
One of the first attempts to prevent these attacks for location data is the work by
(Cormode et al. 2012) who adapted spatial indexing methods such as quadtrees and kd-trees to provide
spatial decompositions that are differentially private. The decompositions allow queries to know how
many individuals (or other point objects in question) fall within a given region. However, considering
the complexity of geosocial network data, this is only one of the many possible queries that entail
private information.
Another possible query is to identify locations of interest near other locations. For instance,
social media applications use the users’ personal trajectories (captured vie check-ins) to give them
suggestions about which places to visit. An attacker may use the recommended locations to make
individual inferences such as the user’s actual trajectory. Zhang et al. (2014) proposed sanitation
approaches that allow recommendations queries without revealing the user’s trajectory. In a similar
way, the LocBorg approach retains online personas by suggesting users add posts that are similar to
their topics of interest but have fake locations (Zakhary et al. 2017). This approach might be useful
for a-spatial studies, in which sensitive attributes and personal profiles are important, but location
accuracy is of no interest.
Another approach based on differential privacy for individual-level location data is the notion of
“geoindistinguishability” (Chatzikokolakis et al. 2015), which allows users to be protected within an
adaptive radius of r, for which the desired privacy (l-privacy) increases with the distance. The advantage
of geoindistinguishability compared to the previous two approaches is that it is applicable to queries
related to a single user (location at specific time) rather than providing aggregate information about
several users.
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Furthermore, a typical use of social media data in research is to identify and examine spatial
clusters of features of interest. Wang et al. (2016) proposed a method that provides differentially
private results in areas with high concentrations of privacy-preserved tweets. The outcome can be
used to identify correlations between users and events without identifying the exact locations. Moving
away from differentially private methods but still looking into research applications, the location
history of users can be used to predict their next locations. Xue et al. (2017) developed a destination
prediction model that explores the check-in service of geosocial networks and a privacy protection
method against such attacks.
8. Discussion and Future Research Directions
The way in which LSBN data are analysed and published in a responsible manner may not only be
a technical question but a legal one as well. Depending on which country data are from and published
in, different legal restrictions that may go beyond the recommendations given in this paper may apply.
Examples of such legal frameworks can be found accompanying the many open data portals that some
governments operate to share their data.
8.1. The EU Open Data Portal and the General Data Protection Guideline (GDPR)
The EU Open Data Portal (European Parliament 2011) is used to unify all open data portals of
the EU member states. As a legal framework, they adhere to the Regulation 45/2001 on processing
of personal data by the EU institutions (European Parliament 2001), which applies by proxy to the
EU member states. However, taking a closer look at how it is implemented in the respective member
states reveals that, even with a universal privacy protection law, differences may occur in this respect.
This is shown by Custers et al. (2017), who compared how different EU governments and their citizens
enforce and allocate resources for data protection and engage in debate about the topic.
As of 25 May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Parliament 2016)
has been in effect, which affects LBSN operating within the European Union or the European Economic
Area. Its goal is to empower users by enforcing transparency and constraints for the storage and
processing of personal data, thus forcing LBSN and other organisations to design their data storage
facilities in a way that precludes misuse. The GDPR requires that personal data are stored according
to principles such as privacy by design and by default, minimising data storage time, informing
individuals about how their data are processed, and purpose limitation. Concretely, it regulates data
processing with respect to the following aspects:
• Lawful basis for processing: if no user consent for data processing has been provided, there
needs to be a legal basis for analysing data, such as public interest, contractual obligations or to
protect the interest of the subject
• Responsibility and accountability: responsibility and the liability of the data controller to
implement effective data and privacy protection measures
• Data protection by design and by default: high level of privacy by default, including encryption,
and rules for the analysis of data
• Pseudonymisation: replacing bits of information with random information (e.g., replacing names
with random names) to avoid re-identification
• Right of access: a subject’s right to access their personal data
• Right to erasure: a subject may request the erasure of all their personal data
• Records of processing activities: documentation of the data processing steps, including their
purpose, the categories of used personal data, the projected time limits for erasure, or a general
description of taken security measures
• Data protection officer: a data protection manager has to be assigned in every institution
• Data breaches: the data controller is legally obliged to notify the supervisory authority about any
data breach
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 191 11 of 17
• Sanctions: warnings, audits or fines can be issued
• Business to business (B2B) marketing: allowed, provided consent or legitimate interest is given
Importantly, for research campaigns, the GDPR does not apply in the following circumstances:
• Lawful interception, national security, military, police, justice
• Statistical and scientific analysis
• Deceased persons are subject to national legislation
• There is a dedicated law on employer-employee relationships
• Processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or
household activity
8.2. The Challenges of Diverging National and Supra-national Legislation
The legal constraints for storing and processing personal data and the right to privacy differ
widely between countries. Noorda and Hanloser (2011) provided an overview of selected national
legislations from across the world and point out some of their incompatibilities. They also gave
examples of cases in which such incompatibilities allowed privacy violations to be committed with
impunity, thus pointing out the impactful consequences of such unclear legal situations. Custers et al.
(2017) showed that even on a smaller scale, within the EU, such incompatibilities exist.
The most severe limiting factor in this regard is the varying interpretation of “privacy” in different
parts of the world. For instance, privacy can be traded as an economic good by its owner in the
USA, whereas it is protected by law in the European Union. An ideal, but unlikely case would
be that supra-national legislation bodies and initiatives set up appropriate world-wide regulations
(Resch et al. 2012). As shown in Figure 1, legislation and governments play highly different roles in
these two environments.
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8.3. Future Research Directions
Section 2.1 outlines the limitations of existing studies on inference attacks. They mainly arise
from the lack of true and measurable actual data. When inferences are being made about private
information of individuals, the ideal means of validating them is by confirming with the tested
individuals. However, in reality, it is virtually impossible to get these individuals to report on
their private matters (e.g., where do you live? Where do you go on weekends?). Furthermore, if
private aspects are reported, they are oftentimes prone to a number of biases such as the cooperative
principle (respondents may alter their statements when answering questions repeatedly), retrospective
biases that may be caused through delayed responding (e.g., inaccurate recall, recency effects, false
memories), or the fact that some respondents may stick with what they answered earlier in order to
appear consistent and not contradict themselves (Bluemke et al. 2017).
A major incentive of inference attack studies is to raise awareness on the negative implications
of regular geosocial media practices of people (e.g., geotagging posts). If such studies are ethically
responsibly conducted and performed by reliable research campaigns, people would potentially
become motivated to participate for the benefit of the society.
In addition, studies on inference attacks typically use the spatial information (i.e., coordinates and
trajectories) to make inferences. However, McKenzie et al. (2016) demonstrated that the protection of
private location information should not be exclusively handled from a spatial perspective. Place-based
information co-exists in the semantic signatures of geosocial footprints such as the spatial, temporal,
and thematic inductiveness of posts. Furthermore, another feature of LBSN that has not been discussed
in this paper is image data (geocoded or not). In fact, the link between image data and information
disclosure remains a significant research gap in the literature of geoprivacy. Image data generally
belong to the LBSN features that may increase the re-identification risk. For example, similarity and
clustering algorithms can match an image “A” (or set of images) to another image “B” (or set of images)
(Kawakubo and Yanai 2011; Lv et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2005). If image “A” belongs to a fully anonymous
account of an LBSN user that has location information data (e.g., geotagged messages and geotagged
pictures), and image “B” belongs to another identifiable account (or any source of information linked
to individuals), then one can draw conclusions about the involved individuals or even infer that they
are the same person. As a result, information from the anonymous account can be disclosed.
Most importantly, the field of computer vision deals, amongst other things, with image location
recognition algorithms (Arase et al. 2009; Zhang and Kosecka 2006; Hays and Efros 2008; Li et al. 2010).
Thus, images of anonymous accounts can be directly processed to identify location patterns of the users.
However, this has not yet been studied in the context of geoprivacy and spatial re-identification risk.
Moreover, there is a need to match and harmonise scientific knowledge (e.g., protection methods
and privacy by design guidelines), and the legal aspects of location privacy (e.g., how should privacy
be protected in Europe based on the GDPR?) with the use of technological tools. One such tool
is a spatial decision support system (SDSS). SDSS can be specified for the application domain of
geoprivacy in order to help and guide “data holders”, researchers (or principal investigators in larger
research campaigns) when anonymising their data. This system can have the form of a graphical user
interface (GUI) to allow users to interact with the program and make informative decisions. As we
explained earlier in the paper, decisions on anonymisation or protection of LBSN data involve certain
standard principles but also depend on, or could be adapted based on, future analyses (e.g., regression,
classification, point pattern analysis, clustering, etc.), as well as the type of release (e.g., an aggregated
table or a detailed point distribution map).
Finally, an essential aspect of future research efforts in the area of geoprivacy are the unclear
consequences that the GDPR may pose. Although the GDPR is in place and has to be followed, it
is not entirely clear which measures researchers need to take to comply with the regulation with
respect to data acquisition, storage, processing, visualisation or sharing. This problem is rooted in
the ambiguous and non-exhaustive formulations of the GDPR. Consequently, detailed interpretations
of the GDPR may only be possible after a number of jurisdictional cases, which may potentially
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 191 13 of 17
compromise current research practices and put severe limits on operational procedures of research
involving personal geodata.
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